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Assimilation, Resistance, and Recent      
Transsexual Marriage Cases 
Anthony S. Winer1 
In the field of Sexuality Law, there is a current debate among certain 
activists and commentators concerning “assimilation” and “resistance.”2  
Some assert that the goal of assimilation should guide policy choices.  The 
view may be, for example, that by framing the goals of sexual minorities in 
the context of the values of the larger population, the larger population will 
identify more readily with sexual minorities and be more receptive to policy 
changes that benefit these minorities.  On the other hand, other critics and 
advocates assert that the situation of sexual minorities is so unique, and 
their genuine needs so radically distinct from those of the dominant 
population, that assimilation is inimical to the minorities’ cause, and 
resistance is the only appropriate approach.  The predominant debate tends 
to presume that these two approaches are mutually exclusive.   
Recent developments on the issue of transsexual marriage cast doubt on 
the usefulness of this dichotomy.  Transsexual people who enter into legal 
marriages with persons whom they consider to be of the opposite sex can be 
said to be engaging in behavior that is simultaneously assimilative and 
resistive.  In advocating for the concerns of people in this position then, 
activists and commentators cannot neatly pin their theoretical foundations 
exclusively on either assimilation or resistance. 
This theoretical observation is put in sharp relief by recent events.  The 
last few months have witnessed major developments in this country in the 
case law of transsexual identity, particularly transsexual marriage.  Recent 
cases decided by the high courts in Kansas3 and Maryland,4 and by a trial 
court in Florida,5 serve to emphasize the degree to which transsexual people 
living in opposite-sex marriages are engaged in behavior that cannot be 
explained as solely assimilation or resistance. 
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A more useful theoretical basis for analyzing the efforts of transsexual 
people in this context comes from the late work of Michel Foucault.  
Specifically, Foucault’s development of the idea of “askēsis” can serve as a 
basis for understanding and advancing the movement for transsexual 
marriages.  Adoption of this approach can move the analysis that courts 
have been using in this area in directions that will be more inclusive and 
less tied to social and theoretical stereotypes. 
DEFINITIONS OF ASSIMILATION AND RESISTANCE 
Initially, I offer my own definitions of assimilation and resistance.6  
These definitions capture the dynamics of the Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual/ 
Transgender (GLBT) experience, while at the same time being sufficiently 
general so as not to lose sight of the foundational meanings of the terms 
themselves.  These definitions are as follows: 
• assimilation is undertaking a set of behaviors patterned after the 
behavior of members of a social group for the purpose of securing 
a place in that group;7  
• resistance is undertaking a set of behaviors amounting to a 
rejection of the need to secure such a place.8 
An example of assimilation in this sense would be a young gay male 
developing an interest in playing conventionally masculine team sports (for 
example, football or hockey) in an effort to secure a place in the societal 
group of young athletic men.  An example of resistance would be a young 
gay male choosing instead to pursue an individual sport (such as tennis or 
swimming), in part as a means of demonstrating the lack of a need to secure 
a place in the societal group of players of conventionally masculine team 
sports.  A further example of resistance, of course, would be a young gay 
male choosing not to participate in sports of any kind, but rather focusing 
on activities such as art, fashion, or theater, thereby demonstrating a 
rejection of the behaviors of the dominant societal group.9 
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One observation that emerges from these definitions is that the same act 
can be characterized as assimilative or resistant, depending on which 
societal perspective is adopted.  This can be illustrated using the sample 
factual circumstances discussed above.  If, in rejecting team sports, the gay 
male chooses instead to develop an interest in grand opera, one might say 
that he was engaging in resistance behavior, because grand opera is far 
removed from stereotypically male interests such as team contact sports, 
boxing and automobile racing.  On the other hand, he could be said to be 
assimilating into certain dominant expectations regarding stereotypical 
interests of gay males.10 
It might be asserted that assimilation is best thought of as being 
assimilative into a dominant group or sub-culture.  In this sense of the term, 
adopting behaviors of gay male opera fans would not be assimilation 
because the group whose behavior is being adopted is not socially 
dominant.  However, this is an unsatisfying approach.  For me, the 
mechanisms of assimilation and resistance are interesting.  Whether one is 
attempting assimilation into a dominant or non-dominant group, one is still 
adjusting behavior to secure a place in the group.  The psychological 
aspects of the decision to assimilate (or resist) still involve an exercise of 
self-definition, regardless of the direction in which one is assimilating (or 
resisting). 
THE FLUIDITY OF ASSIMILATION AND RESISTANCE WITHIN 
TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE  
The fluidity of the supposed dichotomy between assimilation and 
resistance is well illustrated by considering the prototypical fact pattern of 
transsexual marriages that have become the subject of recent court cases.  In 
these situations (described more fully below), a transsexual person who has 
undergone sex reassignment surgery has married a non-transsexual person 
of the primary sex other than the sex transitioned-to.  Facts develop after the 
marriage is entered into calling its validity into doubt.  Either one spouse 
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subsequently dies and there is a dispute over the estate,11 or there is an 
attempt to obtain a court order for maintenance payments,12 or there is a 
child custody dispute,13 or some other basis for legal challenge14 emerges. 
At this point, it is worth considering certain general aspects of this 
prototypical fact pattern to investigate further, what assimilation and 
resistance mean.  First, the decision to recognize one’s self as transsexual 
involves an internal resistance to societal forces.  Conventionally, a person 
born with a particular anatomical sex, but experiencing the identity of the 
other primary anatomical sex, is expected to assimilate.  That is, the person 
is expected to adopt behaviors (particularly in styles of dress) characteristic 
of the assigned anatomical sex at birth.  Refusing to adopt these behaviors 
can be viewed as resistance. 
This mode of resistance is all the more acute when a transsexual person 
undergoes sex-reassignment surgery, as in each of the cases discussed 
below.  One might feel that there could be no greater resistance than 
completing a surgical procedure to reject biological traits that would 
otherwise be seen to exert a requirement to assimilate.  On the other hand, 
undergoing sex reassignment surgery can also be viewed as an act of 
assimilation.  A person identifying as a member of one sex, but bearing 
physical characteristics of the other primary sex, voluntarily and at some 
burden and expense, undertakes a physical operation to be more like the sex 
of identification.  Although the mechanism for change is physiological 
rather than behavioral, a type of assimilation takes place. 
The prototypical fact pattern in the recent cases seems to involve even a 
greater degree of assimilation as the transsexual person marries a non-
transsexual spouse.  Heterosexual marriage between one man and one 
woman is the norm for marital relationships in this country; indeed, it is the 
only form of marriage sanctioned by the laws of any state.15  Traditional 
marriage is so emblematic of conventional relations between the sexes that 
social critics, such as feminists16 and queer activists,17 have viewed it as 
problematic for years.   
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Accordingly, entering into a traditional male-female marriage can be 
viewed as significantly assimilationist for any couple.  This is even more 
dramatically true when one spouse is a post-operative transsexual.  The act 
of marriage to a non-transsexual spouse would be behavior that has the 
effect of placing the transsexual spouse very much in the center of expected 
societal norms for persons of the gender transitioned-to.18   
The insufficiency of a dichotomous approach would come as no surprise 
to those at the vanguard of the current transgender movement.  Some of the 
most active and aggressive advocates for transgender issues are rejecting a 
strict dichotomy of male and female.  Gender for them is not a question of 
either/or.  Rather, gender is perceived as existing in a wide variety of forms.   
Once again, it is best to be clear at the outset regarding terminology.  In 
this essay, the word “transgender” is used as an umbrella term that covers 
transsexuals, transvestites, and all those who identify (for one purpose or 
another, or to one extent or another) with a sex other than that with which 
they were born.  The phrase “transsexual person,” on the other hand, 
specifically references a person born with physiological characteristics of 
one sex, who desires to live as a member of the other primary sex. 
The traditional view of transsexualism was susceptible to conforming to 
the conventional dichotomy between male and female.  One was born as a 
male, but identified as a female, or one was born as a female, but identified 
as a male.  This presented the choice to a transsexual person of whether or 
not to opt for sex-reassignment surgery.  By viewing that choice as a matter 
of either assimilation or resistance, the analysis ultimately resulted in a 
degree of ambiguity and equivocation, as noted in the discussion above.  A 
transgender person’s transition to a different sex could be viewed as both 
resistance and assimilation.  It could be seen as resistance because the 
person was behaving in a way that rejected the anatomical sex at birth.  It 
could also be seen as assimilative because in adopting the behaviors, dress 
and physiognomy of the sex of identification, the transitioning person was 
making use of conventionally defined patterns of gender presentation. 
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However, the rejection by many modern transgender activists of the 
male/female dichotomy eliminates this ambiguity.  For these activists there 
is no perceived need to solidly identify as either completely male or 
completely female.19  Rather, they can refer to a “constellation” of genders 
and eschew the idea of one’s gender being exclusively male or female.20  
Accordingly, the need to undergo surgery, or even assume any consistent 
form of sexual identity, does not exist. 
Of course, one can consider this developing constellation approach to 
gender as being squarely on the resistance side of the assimilation/resistance 
divide.  Eschewing the conventional male/female dichotomy is a 
revolutionary approach, essentially rejecting a tenet that many would regard 
as socially foundational.  One might therefore assert that the development 
of the constellation approach is a straightforward example of resistance, and 
that the assimilation/resistance dichotomy still retains analytical vitality. 
Even with the constellation approach to gender, most transgender people 
would still be making use of tropes of masculinity and femininity.  The 
identification of certain characteristics with one of the two primary sexes is, 
at least for the moment, inescapable.  Even if a transgender person refuses 
to identify solely as male or female for all purposes, or at least for some 
purposes at a given point in time, that person’s identification will be made 
of a collection of factors and influences (style of dress, hair style, jewelry, 
make up, gait, demeanor, voice, etc.).  Even if the totality of these factors 
and influences is conventionally ambiguous, each one will still key 
individually into established norms of sexual identification. 
Accordingly, even under the vanguard constellation approach to 
transgender identity, there is substantial fluidity between the concepts of 
assimilation and resistance.  It is difficult to say in any given instance 
whether one is assimilating or resisting, since the same act can be viewed as 
an example of either phenomenon at the same time.  Indeed, the situation of 
transgender people in the current environment solidifies, rather than 
weakens, this observation. 
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FLUIDITY OF IDENTIFICATION AND THE LATE WORK OF MICHEL 
FOUCAULT 
The work of French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault has been 
extremely influential in recent years.21  His work includes significant 
references to the idea of resistance,22 and accordingly may be viewed as a 
progenitor of the assimilation/resistance dichotomy. 
Among the most significant23 of Foucault’s later works were The Use of 
Pleasure24 and The Care of the Self.25  In these works, Foucault investigates 
selected philosophical sources from antiquity to determine the origins of 
intellectual views of sexuality.26 Two of the main themes developed in these 
volumes are askēsis, practical training of an individual in order to form as a 
moral subject,27 and “the cultivation of the self,” a fundamental and time-
consuming process requiring concentration on the individual soul and its 
development.28   
Carlos Ball has given substantial attention to these works and has 
emphasized that they evince attention to “technologies of the self,” which 
allow individuals to undertake “a certain number of operations on their own 
souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being.”29  He concludes that the 
classical approaches elucidated by Foucault had as their goal a 
transformation “in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection or immortality.”30 
Although these final works by Foucault have attracted less attention than 
those produced earlier in his career, other commentators have also provided 
some attention to them.  For example, David Halperin has investigated 
Foucault’s idea of askēsis in detail.31  He determined that although it bears 
some relation to the modern idea of asceticism, it was not necessarily a 
form of self-denial.32  Rather, Halperin sees it is an exhortation to the 
pursuit of discipline to achieve well-being and self-actuation, rather than 
repression.  It thus can transform a person who experiences gratifications 
and desires without understanding and control, into a person who 
understands, controls, and deploys them for optimal self-actuation. 
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In these late works, Foucault seems to suggest that being governed by a 
sensitivity akin to classical askēsis can be productive.  Although these late 
volumes certainly do not say so explicitly, Foucault seemed to be going in 
the direction of concluding that modern individuals should at least consider 
the possibility that optimal behavior in sexual areas could be best informed 
by an enlightened development of the self.  This would no doubt be as 
opposed to an externally-imposed legal code of behavior, but quite possibly 
a socially-imposed code as well, even if it were not explicitly legal in 
character. 
A modern kind of askēsis, understood as a care of the self, can thus 
present an analytical tool distinct from an assimilation/resistance 
dichotomy.  A part of the problem with the assimilation/resistance 
dichotomy, as outlined above, is that its meaning depends on a reference to 
a societal group.  One is either assimilating to an explicit societal group or 
sub-group, or rejecting it through resistance.  Since society always consists 
of numerous sub-groupings, and since human motivations are almost 
always multi-dimensional, any analysis along the assimilation/resistance 
spectrum must to a degree be ambiguous and indeterminate. 
However, focusing on a more “Foucauldian” idea of askēsis does not 
require a societal reference in order to derive meaning.  Rather, the precepts 
of conduct can emanate from one’s own self-cultivation, the product of a 
lifetime of sincere and honest inquiry, reflection, and experimentation.  This 
dynamic is more consonant with the modern transsexual experience than a 
dichotomy of assimilation and resistance.  A given behavior or set of 
behaviors may partake of both assimilation and resistance at the same time, 
but perhaps this is not important.  What may be more important is the 
development of the self and the process of askēsis through which it arose. 
The process undertaken by transsexual people is a paradigmatic example 
of what Foucault must have been suggesting as a modern idea of askēsis.  A 
male-to-female post-operative transsexual, for example, pursues a process 
of self-development and self-definition with diligence and determination, in 
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an effort to achieve well-being.  It is a demanding and arduous process that 
warrants respect.  It is a prime example of an “operation on the soul . . . in 
order to attain a state of happiness”33 and produce a transformation to attain 
self-actuation.34 
Given that this is the case, it should not matter whether the transformative 
process is viewed within the mold of assimilation or resistance.  A 
transsexual’s own definitions of his or her own self should be what matters, 
not his or her relationship with societal expectations.  If the theoretical 
focus on the assimilation/resistance dichotomy is not helpful in viewing 
transsexuals generally, it certainly is even less helpful when considering the 
case of transsexuals in opposite-sex marriages, since there the distinction, as 
shown above,35 is even less determinate.  The ultimate implication is that if 
the dichotomy is not helpful in the context of transsexual marriage, it may 
not be very helpful in viewing other aspects of queer experience either. 
In the transsexual marriage cases described below, the courts wrestle with 
the process of defining the sex of transsexual persons for purposes of 
applying state marriage laws.  There is some degree of progress, from an 
activist’s perspective, in the way more recent decisions have considered a 
broader set of criteria in defining sex.  However, even this broader approach 
can be viewed as basically an exercise in assimilationist analysis.  It will be 
shown that this creates unfortunate implications.  At some point, the 
assimilationist model will be insufficient, and an approach more akin to 
Foucauldian askēsis will become more appropriate. 
RECENT TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE CASES 
Through the end of the 20th Century 
Until the end of the 1990’s, the situation involving transsexual marriage 
in the United States was relatively clear.  Although one state intermediate 
appellate court found in favor of the legitimacy of a marriage involving a 
transsexual person, four other decisions in four other jurisdictions, one 
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issued by the highest civil court in the state, found against the validity of 
such marriages. 
The favorable decision was M.J. v. J.T.,36 decided by the Appellate 
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court.  The facts involved a 
transsexual woman who, after the completion of sex-reassignment surgery, 
had engaged in a ceremonial marriage with a man, from whom she later 
sought a court order for maintenance.37  Upon the instigation of her suit for 
maintenance, the man argued that the plaintiff was not a woman and that 
therefore the marriage was void.  The court held that, upon the completion 
of a person’s successful reassignment surgery, there was no legal barrier to 
prevent that person from marrying a person of the sex that was opposite to 
the transitioned-to sex.38 
The four negative cases could be treated as a related series, beginning 
with Corbett v. Corbett.39  Corbett was actually an English case, but it had 
been, and continues to be, cited by U.S. courts so consistently that it came 
to be viewed as integral to U.S. case law on the subject.  The facts involved 
a male-to-female transsexual who had undergone sex-reassignment surgery 
prior to her marriage with a man.  The English court determined that “the 
biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), 
and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the 
opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means.”40  The court determined the 
three tests that should be used for sexual identity should be chromosomal, 
gonadal, and genital.41  By these standards, the transsexual woman was a 
man, and therefore the marriage was void. 
The next case in the series was Anonymous v. Anonymous, a New York 
State Supreme Court case from 1971.42  The facts were unusual for cases in 
this area, in that the non-transsexual spouse claimed, and the court found, 
that prior to the marriage there had been no knowledge of the other party’s 
transsexualism.  The court held that the marriage was not valid. 
The remaining cases were In re Ladrach,43 from an Ohio county probate 
court in 1987, and Littleton v. Prange,44 from the Texas Court of Appeals in 
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1999.  Ladrach falls outside of the prototype for these cases, because the 
issue was joined when the transsexual applied for a marriage license, 
whereas the other cases involve the validity of a marriage that has already 
occurred.  The Texas case has been the more influential of the two, in part 
due to its provenance from the highest civil appellate court in the State.  
Both Ladrach and Littleton cited Corbett, and both determined that the 
marriage, or requested marriage, involving the transsexual person was 
invalid. 
These early cases indicated that U.S. courts would probably look at a 
restrictive set of factors, primarily chromosomal, gonadal, and genital 
characteristics, in determining sex for purposes of marriage.  The New 
Jersey court in M.T. v. J.T. was an exception, but even that opinion did not 
include a detailed discussion of various factors that could be used in 
determining sex.  Rather, the court seemed to base its determination that the 
male-to-female transsexual was a woman for purposes of marriage on the 
fact that she had undergone sex-reassignment surgery.45 
In re Gardiner in 2001 and 2002 
It appeared as though the situation might change in 2001 with the 
issuance of the intermediate appellate court opinion for In re Estate of 
Marshall G. Gardiner.46  In Gardiner, the court adopted a detailed and 
multifaceted approach to determine sex for the purpose of marriage.  The 
state supreme court overruled this approach in 2002.47  However, the 
approach of the intermediate court had nonetheless been published, which 
established the possibility of more favorable rulings elsewhere in the future. 
The facts involved Marshall Gardiner, a northeast Kansas businessman 
who had accumulated “some wealth.”  Somewhat later in life, he married 
J’Noel Ball, who was a post-operative male-to-female transsexual.  
Marshall had a son, named Joe, by an earlier marriage, from whom he was 
estranged at the time of his marriage to J’Noel.  Marshall died intestate, and 
Joe and J’Noel filed opposing court papers concerning the proper 
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disposition of Marshall’s estate.  Joe ultimately asserted in these papers that 
the marriage between Marshall and J’Noel was invalid, on the theory that 
J’Noel was a man under relevant Kansas statutes, and that under Kansas law 
there could be no marriage between persons of the same sex.48 
The state trial court found that the marriage was invalid, because J’Noel 
was born a male and, in the court’s view, remained a male for the purposes 
of Kansas’s marriage law.49  The Kansas Court of Appeals, however, 
determined that the issue of whether an individual was male or female at the 
time of marriage is a matter of fact in each case.  The appellate court held 
that a trial court “may use chromosome makeup as one factor, but not the 
exclusive factor, in arriving at a decision.”50   
The appellate court adopted the criteria suggested by Professor Julie 
Greenberg in a 1999 law review article as the additional factors a trial court 
should consider.51  These criteria were: gonadal sex, internal morphologic 
sex, external morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, assigned sex 
and gender of rearing, and sexual identity.52  The appellate court reversed 
the trial court and remanded for a full hearing, to allow each side to present 
evidence on at least the factors enumerated in the Greenberg article.53 
At that time, many GLBT and transgender activists viewed this result as 
salutary.  Clearly, the appellate court’s insistence that sex be determined 
according to a variety of factors, rather than merely chromosomes, seemed 
less narrow and less hostile than previous decisions resting on 
chromosomes alone.  Nevertheless, there was cause for some misgivings 
regarding the appellate court analysis.  The Court of Appeals still was 
treating J’Noel’s sex as a “question of fact.”54  The employment of this 
approach in some cases could lead courts to find that some transsexuals, 
even those who had undertaken substantial steps to transition, were still not 
of the sex of identification. 
Furthermore, under the appellate court’s approach, a transsexual person’s 
status could depend on the extent of that person’s assimilation.  That posited 
assimilation could be of a particularly onerous variety.  For example, a 
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male-to-female transsexual could be considered female to the extent her 
various characteristics approximated those of someone born female.  Yet, as 
much as she might wish to be considered female, and as much as that desire 
would be valid, everyone would concede that she, in fact, was not born 
morphologically female, at least not completely.   
Accordingly, not only was the endeavor prescribed by the appellate court 
one of assimilation, but it required a transsexual wife in such a case to 
assimilate to that which all would agree she was not:  someone who had 
been born morphologically female.  Her marital rights thus depended on the 
extent to which her assimilation had approximated something that she 
admittedly was not.  Theoretically, this was not a completely comforting 
result even if it did help J’Noel’s position from the standpoint of the legal 
strategy.55   
This observation illustrates the perils of attempting to use an 
assimilationist strategy in the legal context.  Assimilationism is, in many 
instances, an approximation to something that is not.  This is the case for 
the gay man attempting to become like heterosexual men by adopting an 
interest or facility in team sports.  However, the fact that he might succeed 
in adopting the interest or facility, and thus assimilate into a social group of 
heterosexual men, does not mean that he himself is not gay.  When “the 
chips are down” and “push comes to shove,” when it really matters whether 
one is gay or straight, his assimilation may not protect him. 
Similarly, a male-to-female transsexual may assimilate into the context of 
heterosexual marriage by marrying a man.  But, when the situation becomes 
greatly intensified, as in the case of a contest over the husband’s estate, if 
her rights depend on the extent to which she has assimilated into the role of 
someone who was born female, the results may be no less negative.  It 
would be open to a trier of fact to determine that, although she may well 
have assimilated in many respects, she still had not assimilated enough.  
One suspects that in the minds of some triers of fact applying the Kansas 
appellate court’s test, no collection of characteristics could amount to 
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adequate assimilation.  The model toward which assimilation was directed, 
being born a female, was something that could never strictly be achieved.  
It would be better in such cases to employ a test that did not depend on 
the extent of assimilation measured by objective factors.  It may be 
understandable why the Kansas appellate court employed this approach.  
However, a more welcoming and more humane approach would focus 
simply on the extent of the self-identification experienced by the 
transsexual woman herself.  This approach would also be more in line with 
the Foucauldian idea of the culture of the self and the deployment of 
individual askēsis. 
In any event, even under Kansas law, the importance of a married 
transsexual’s degree of assimilation was short-lived.  Less than a year after 
the appellate court’s opinion in Gardiner, the Kansas Supreme Court 
reversed in all respects relevant to this discussion.  The court’s opinion was 
couched in non-inflammatory terms, and it included copious and lengthy 
verbatim quotes from the appellate opinion.  However, the actual effects of 
this opinion may be more chilling, and more vicious, than its non-
confrontational rhetoric would indicate.  
Whereas the appellate court had treated J’Noel’s sex as a matter of fact, 
the supreme court stated, “[w]e view the issue in this appeal to be one of 
law and not fact.”56  Quoting from Black’s Law Dictionary, the supreme 
court defined marriage, in relevant part as, “the legal status, condition or 
relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, or until 
divorced.”57 
In perhaps the most chilling passage, the supreme court declared simply 
that “[t]he words ‘sex,’ ‘male,’ and ‘female’ in everyday understanding do 
not encompass transsexuals.”58  Thus, the court seemed to be saying that in 
order to be married under Kansas law, one needs to have the sex of either 
male or female, and transsexuals are not encompassed by either term.   
It does not take much to supply what may be the most apparent 
conclusion to these major and minor premises.  Namely, that under Kansas 
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law it may be that transsexuals may not marry at all, regardless of the sex of 
their chosen partners.  This, at any rate, seems to be the most direct reading 
of the state supreme court’s opinion.  Given the stunning import of the 
court’s approach, it was almost anti-climatic for the court to offer, in 
concluding its discussion on this point, that “J’Noel does not fit the 
common meaning of female.”59 
Post-Gardiner Cases from February 2003 
In February of 2003, a trial court in Florida and the highest court in 
Maryland both issued decisions that seem, at first glance, to advance the 
interests of transsexuals.  The opinions contain much that is positive.  
However, the trial court opinion provides a further indication of the dangers 
of an assimilationist analysis, and the Maryland court is actually silent on 
the most salient points regarding transsexual marriage. 
In the case of In re the Marriage of Michael Kantaras,60 the Sixth 
Judicial Circuit Court for Pasco County, Florida issued an exceptionally 
detailed opinion, 809 pages in length.  The case involved a post-operative 
female-to-male transsexual, Michael Kantaras, who married a non-
transsexual female, Linda.  The couple was married for nine years before 
filing cross-petitions for divorce and custody of the two children they had 
raised together.61  Linda’s court papers contended that, because Michael 
was born a woman, the marriage was void.62  The court determined that 
Michael was a male and that the marriage was legal.63 The court went on to 
award primary residential custody to Michael.64 
Kantaras determined that there were essentially five factors that 
established that Michael was legally a male: (1) as a child his parents and 
siblings, observing his male characteristics, agreed he should have been 
born a boy; (2) Michael had always perceived himself as a male and had 
played male sports, performed male household chores, and refused to wear 
female clothing; (3) prior to marriage he had “successfully completed the 
full process of transsexual reassignment;” (4) at the time of the marriage, 
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Linda was informed and accepting about Michael’s transsexual status; and 
(5) before and after the marriage, Michael had been accepted as a man in a 
variety of social and legal ways.65 
The result of the Kantaras decision, the detail and care with which it 
treated its subjects, and the comparatively broad scope of factors it took into 
account in arriving at its determination, can all be viewed as positive for the 
transsexual cause.  It remains to be seen, of course, whether the decision 
will survive any possible appeals or subsequent holdings.  Even apart from 
later judicial developments, the approach the trial court took is problematic 
with respect to the assimilationist dangers discussed above. 
The emphasis that the Kantaras court placed on full sex reassignment 
surgery raises a problem.  The complete language of the court’s ruling on 
this point is as follows: 
Prior to marriage he successfully completed the full process of 
transsexual reassignment, involving hormone treatment, 
irreversible medical surgery that removed all of his female organs 
inside of his body, including having a male reconstructed chest, a 
male voice, a male configured body and hair with beard and 
moustache, and a naturally developed penis.66 
By placing such a pointed emphasis on the completeness of the surgical 
and physiological processes, the Kantaras court adopts an assimilationist 
approach.  The approach of the court in Kantaras is similar to that of the 
intermediate appellate court in Gardiner.  The approaches are also different 
in some respects.  In Gardiner, the court numerically listed seven biological 
and experiential factors that should be considered when judicially 
determining sex, whereas in Kantaras, the court puts substantial weight on 
the completeness of sex-reassignment surgery.   
However, in both cases the emphasis is on the degree to which the 
transsexual person has conformed himself or herself to a person who was 
born with the sexual morphology of a person of the transitioned-to sex.  As 
noted earlier in the discussion of Gardiner, the result of this approach is that 
Assimilation, Resistance, and Recent Transsexual Marriage Cases 669 
VOLUME 1 • ISSUE 3 • 2003 
the transsexual’s case hinges on the extent to which he or she resembles 
something that he or she is not, someone who was born with the anatomical 
morphology of the transitioned-to sex. 
The difficulty becomes more apparent if one posits a situation like that of 
Michael Kantaras, but where the medical or surgical procedures have been 
less extensive.  For example, someone who has received hormone treatment 
and some medical treatment to alter secondary sex characteristics, but has 
not undergone invasive surgical alterations of primary sex organs.  It seems 
quite possible that, based on the rationale of the Kantaras decision, such a 
person will not have “successfully completed the full process of transsexual 
reassignment.” 
A more satisfactory approach, and one more in keeping with a 
Foucauldian idea of askēsis, would rely not so much on the fullness of the 
medical process engaged in, but rather on the extent of everything the 
transsexual person had done.  Such factors as the length of time Michael 
had been living as a man, the commitment he had exhibited to living as a 
male, and the extent to which he had taken steps to alter his legal status for 
legal, professional and social purposes would all be primary factors. 
The other positive case development in February of 2003, was the 
opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals in, In the Matter of Robert 
Wright Heilig; Janet Heilig Wright.67  This case involved a female-to-male 
transsexual who petitioned for an order that would change his name and 
also change his sexual identity designation.68  The trial court refused to 
grant the petition, concluding that gender was not subject to modification.69 
The Maryland high court vacated and remanded with instructions.  The 
court’s opinion contains a concise, but inclusive, review of medical 
authorities on the subject of transsexualism.70  The court came to a 
conclusion that is welcome in the transsexual community, “a person’s 
psychological gender identity has received recognition as one of the 
determinants of gender and plays a powerful role in the person’s psychic 
makeup and adaptation.”71  The high court also stated, “gender … may be, 
670 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LAW & SEXUALITY 
or possibly may become, other than what is recorded on the person’s birth 
certificate.”72  The court vacated the trial court’s ruling, since that ruling 
had concluded that gender was not subject to modification, and directed the 
trial court “to consider admissible evidence relevant to the issue” as to 
whether the petitioner had changed his sex.73 
As affirmative as this may seem for transsexuals, the Heilig case is 
problematic in two pivotal respects.  First, the opinion is deliberately vague 
on what a petitioner must show to successfully obtain an order reflecting a 
change in designated sexual identity.  To the extent it gives guidance on the 
issue, the opinion, in line with Kantaras, places significant emphasis on 
surgical operations. 
The Heilig court’s discussion does not list factors to consider, but simply 
recites the requirement in effect in many states that, in order to change a 
birth certificate, the individual’s gender must have been changed “by 
surgical procedure.”74  The court observes that laws requiring surgery as a 
condition to recognizing a change in sex “rarely, if ever, specify the kind of 
surgery that will suffice.”75  The court goes on to warn that, “[a]ny reasoned 
legal conclusion [must] be based on admissible evidence of medical fact.”76  
The court purposely concludes thereafter, without giving any further 
indication as to what one must do in order to successfully obtain a 
designation of changed sex.  What the court does provide suggests the pre-
eminence of a surgical procedure and other physiological operations.  
Again, this leaves open the possibility discussed regarding the Gardiner 
intermediate holding and the Kantaras opinion.  The indication of these 
decisions is that, where the court determines that a person’s physiological 
changes are not full or complete, the individual may not receive a positive 
result.  This, in turn, reflects the unsuitability of an assimilative approach. 
The second problem with Heilig, in this context, is that it explicitly 
excludes any direct relevance to the subject of marriage.  In directing the 
trial court to reconsider the requested sex-change designation, the court 
emphasized that it was not opining on “what the collateral effect of any 
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judgment attesting to a change in gender might be.”77  The possibility that a 
legal change of sex can affect a person’s capacity to marry is relegated to a 
long footnote that cites Corbett, M.T. v. J.T., Littleton and Gardiner.78  But 
having referenced these cases and after briefly discussing some related 
points, the court concludes at the end of this footnote that “[t]his is an issue 
that is not before us in this case and upon which we express no opinion.”79   
CONCLUSION 
The particular analysis and holding in the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
decision of the Gardiner case may have destructive effects for transsexuals 
in Kansas.  If such an approach is adopted broadly by other states, the 
consequences for transsexuals around the country could be devastating.  
Indeed, they could well provide added evidence for the assertion by Paisley 
Currah and Shannon Minter that, in many contexts, transsexuals are not 
viewed as fully human.80  Fortunately, recent cases may presage a move 
away from these consequences, but it will be important for the transgender 
and GLBT communities to keep track of these developments and take 
appropriate action. 
I have focused on the circumstances of transsexual marriage from a more 
theoretical perspective.  My intent has been to explore what the legal 
treatment of marriages involving transsexuals has to say about the dynamic 
of assimilation and resistance.  The application of these two terms cannot 
help but be indeterminate and ambiguous in the context of GLBT issues.  
The journey of the Gardiner case through the Kansas state courts, in 
particular, illustrates the difficulties that can arise when courts, and perhaps 
litigating parties as well, apply analytical techniques sounding in the 
assimilation/resistance dichotomy. 
From a theoretical perspective, ideas about assimilation and resistance 
may ultimately turn out to be less useful than other, more individually-
directed, ideas.  An example would be the kind of cultivation of the self and 
individual askēsis developed by Michel Foucault in his History of Sexuality.  
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Such a view approaches sexuality issues from the standpoint of the need to 
effectuate those transformations of the self that result in a state of optimal 
fulfillment.  Indeed, for some time, transsexuals and transgender activists 
have explored and experienced the pull of the self in the forces that define 
their lives.  The true imperatives of this issue are less about assimilation or 
resistance, and more about self-fulfillment. 
Specifically, the imperative for askēsis would dictate that substantial 
weight be given to the experience of the transsexual spouse in transitioning 
from one sex to the other.  It is an improvement when courts credit a broad 
set of factors to determine sex in these cases, but there is danger as well, to 
the extent that the factors used evince an assimilationist perspective.  A 
more comprehensive improvement involves placing the transitioning person 
in more direct control of the determination of sex, through emphasis on his 
or her own discipline and commitment to the endeavor. 
The endeavor of sexual transition, as experienced by the person 
undergoing the transition, is an exercise in Foucauldian askēsis.  With 
regard to the long-term suitability of the interests of transsexuals, the most 
meaningful factors to consider should accordingly be those related to the 
ascetic endeavor of the individuals involved including: length of time spent 
living as the transitioned-to sex; actions taken to effectuate the transition for 
legal, social, and professional purposes; and other elements of the 
transsexual person’s own experience.  These factors should be given 
substantial weight in addition to, and perhaps even as primary over, 
physiological factors. 
The alternative approach I am suggesting is hardly free of difficulty.  It 
does however, have the advantage of beginning from precepts less 
dependent on relations to the other, and more dependent on relations to the 
self. 
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